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Abstract—Energy cooperatives (ECs) such as residential and
industrial microgrids have the potential to mitigate increasing
fluctuations in renewable electricity generation, but only if
their joint response is coordinated. However, the coordination
and control of independently operated flexible resources (e.g.,
storage, demand response) imposes critical challenges arising
from the heterogeneity of the resources, conflict of interests,
and impact on the grid. Correspondingly, overcoming these chal-
lenges with a general and fair yet efficient exchange mechanism
that coordinates these distributed resources will accommodate
renewable fluctuations on a local level, thereby supporting the
energy transition. In this paper, we introduce such an exchange
mechanism. It incorporates a payment structure that encourages
prosumers to participate in the exchange by increasing their
utility above baseline alternatives. The allocation from the pro-
posed mechanism increases the system efficiency (utilitarian social
welfare) and distributes profits more fairly (measured by Nash
social welfare) than individual flexibility activation. A case study
analyzing the mechanism performance and resulting payments
in numerical experiments over real demand and generation
profiles of the Pecan Street dataset elucidates the efficacy to
promote cooperation between co-located flexibilities in residential
cooperatives through local exchange.
Index Terms—Exchange Mechanism, Energy Cooperative,
Multi-agent System, Flexibility, Market Design.
I. INTRODUCTION
Energy Cooperatives (ECs) of prosumers are gaining con-
siderable traction due to their potentials for efficient energy
management, reduced grid dependency, and increased local
consumption of distributively generated renewable energy.
Establishing a local market can facilitate the management of
distributed renewable generation that needs to consume as
locally as possible [1].
A generic prosumer marketplace can be envisaged as a
multiagent system that hosts heterogeneous services with a
large number of participant prosumers which take actions au-
tonomously [2]. This autonomy and diversity form a complex
system where efficient mechanisms such as local markets are
crucial [3]. The necessity of establishing a local prosumer
marketplace (in the sense of the scope and proximity of the
served area) that fulfills the requirements of decentralized
production and consumption is therefore of a paramount
importance [4]. Flexibility, on the other hand, can be enabled
by facilitating Demand Response [5], which is an important
element in the prosumer-centric energy market. While previous
works have highlighted the need for demand response (DR)
markets they have not considered small-scale prosumers as
market participants in a local market. One example considers
stakeholders such as DSO, TSO (as buyers), aggregators and
customers (as sellers) [6]. However, market interactions down
to the level of prosumers are not considered. Another work
presented an effort-based DR service where the DR partic-
ipants are benefited against the time of their stalling effort
and showed that by doing so, the system achieves socially
efficient allocations [7]. However, the implications of such an
innovative design on the real electricity market scenarios are
not entertained.
Coordination of flexible resources/devices while aggregating
their flexibility usually requires a detailed understanding of
the underlying characteristics [5] of those devices which may
be hard to obtain in many scenarios and thus hinders the
scalability of the system. A considerable amount of research is
focused on the management of heterogeneous devices (e.g. PV
generator, storages, gas micro-turbine) through a centralized
controller [8], while hierarchical controls of microgrid through
several levels of control architecture [9], [10] show promising
applicability in this domain. Additionally, in order to opti-
mally manage and control flexibility in demand side, previous
works deploy aggregators [11], [12] that essentially combine
the available flexibilities and trade them on the customers’
behalf. However, this is not a straightforward process and
may have negative impacts such as increasing the imbalance
of Balancing Responsible Parties (BRPs) and leading to en-
gaging in further coordination between the participants [13].
Moreover, the underlying loss emerging from the balancing
activity incurred due to energy-only trading are socialized,
which means prosumers are priced equally regardless of
their marginal contributions to the overall loss. Hence, it is
critically important to improve the fairness of the balancing
cost attributions. Consequently, the need for a general and
fair yet effective coordination and control scheme for flexible
resources through local market design becomes crucial.
In light of these related works and the narrative aforemen-
tioned, this paper contributes to the state of the art by:
• Proposing a real-time exchange mechanism that promotes
efficient allocations in ECs, coordinating heterogeneous
and individually-controlled flexible resources.
• Proposing a payment structure – integrated with the
proposed mechanism – that incentivizes the prosumers
to participate in the exchange mechanism, rewards them
according to their contributions to system loss reduction,
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and by doing so, increases the social welfare of the
residential community.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
describes the prosumer marketplace and outlines the oper-
ation necessary for the exchange mechanism. The proposed
control and exchanged mechanism is detailed in Section III.
Section IV elaborates the prosumers’ utility and the fairness
of the mechanism. A simulation case study is presented in
Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper with a
glimpse of possible follow-up research.
II. PROSUMER MARKETPLACE AND OPERATION OUTLINE
In this section, we describe a real-time exchange mechanism
that operates on a local prosumer marketplace with associated
market offers that are necessary for the market formation.
Prosumers in a cooperative are represented by software agents,
therefore, we will use the terms agent and prosumer inter-
changeably. While we discuss it in the context of storage
flexibility from batteries, it is applicable to the flexibility of
demand response as well.
In this section, we describe a real-time market with market
offers that are necessary for residential ECs. The market while
operating locally, facilitates trading energy and flexibility
(of consumption, commonly known as Demand Response)
among the prosumers. The prosumers of the cooperative are
represented by software agents. Therefore, we will use the
terms agent and prosumer interchangeably. The prosumers are
assumed to be equipped with PV and Battery (as flexible
resources). To this end, we formalize the market offers and
associated commodities.
A. Market offers
A market offer o = (c, p, f) is defined as a tuple comprising
a commodity c ∈ C with a price tag p and a flag stating whether
the offer is a bid (f = 1) or an ask (f = 0). The offer can
be further extended by adding a quantity n, differentiating
between limit orders and fill-or-kill orders l, and an expiry
timestamp texp.
B. Commodity classes
A commodity, in general term, is a marketable item (typ-
ically, a good or a service) produced to satisfy demand or
need [14]. In the context of the electric power market, a
commodity comprises power time series, giving rise to several
interesting classes as services.
• Energy: C = (q, t), where q and t are equal-length
vectors of time and quantity respectively, defining a
(possibly continuous) time series with ∀i : qi ≥ 0, with
the convention that the last quantity is zero.
• Demand Response: C = (q, t), where q and t are vectors
of time and quantity respectively, defining a (possibly
continuous) time series, possibly imposing the zero-sum
constraint
∑
i qi = 0 to make this class of commodities
complementary to energy This constraint may simplify
discrimination from energy commodities but may be
counter-productive as it avoids demand response losses to
be included in the commodity. However, since losses can-
not be standardized, demand response is rather amenable
to negotiation than auction-based commodity trading.
In this article, however, we limit the contribution to devising
exchange mechanisms of Energy commodity while keeping
the Demand Response activated by indirectly controlling the
local flexibility. The market protocol proceeds in rounds where
every agent submits a bid (or ask), allocations are computed by
matching bids and asks, establishing the market equilibrium.
In this paper, however, we have assumed all bids (and asks)
are cleared by a local exchange market. The exchange market
clears the offers in near real-time and provides the allocations
back to the agents. The operation outline is detailed in the
following section.
C. Operation outline
The high-level operational outline of the proposed mecha-
nism is shown in Figure 1. In brief, the mechanism periodically
accepts offers from prosumers, computes the allocated ex-
change quantities by matching offers, and responds back to the
prosumers with those allocations. The additional payments are
calculated retrospectively after a predefined operation cycle
of T discrete time periods is completed. Specifically, the
algorithm proceeds as follows:
• Step 1: For each time t ∈ T , repeat Step 1.1 to Step 1.5.
– Step 1.1: Collect the market offers from all prous-
mers, segregating bids and asks based on the embed-
ded f flag.
– Step 1.2: Tabulate the quantities with round-trip effi-
ciencies of each flexible devices of sellers (detailed
in Section III).
– Step 1.3: Determine the allocations, using the bids
and efficiencies of the devices after applying the
proposed exchange mechanism.
– Step 1.4: Respond back to the prosumers with the al-
locations, where the prosumers realize the exchange
and deploy batteries.
– Step 1.5: Transact the prosumer-specific residual net
energy with the Grid.
• Step 2: Determine the payments of prosumers as detailed
in Section IV. The form of payment includes the transac-
tions with the Grid, realized energy exchange with peer
prosumers, and allocated flexibility activation.
Next, we introduce the baseline cases of No flexibility and
Individual control, and proceed to provide a brief description
of the proposed exchange mechanism (i.e. Exchange and
control), which is elaborated in the subsequent section.
• No flexibility: Considers the simplest case where there
is no exchange and the flexibility is deactivated (i.e.,
batteries are not considered). The net-demand is always
resolved by interacting with the main Grid.
• Individual control: The agents individually control their
batteries by charging with excess PV and by discharging
to serve their own load. Agents are not allowed to
exchange energy.
Fig. 1. High-level operational outline of the coordinating exchange mechanism: exchange and control (Section III) followed by payment computation
(Section IV).
• Exchange and control: Agents are allowed to exchange
energy. We assume a centralized exchange is responsible
for computing allocations from participants’ offers (see
Section III). An offer comprises the net demand and
the round-trip efficiency of their flexibility (e.g., battery
efficiency). By doing so, our proposed mechanism is able
to improve allocative efficiency by resolving flexibility
needs with the most efficient means.
III. EXCHANGE AND CONTROL MECHANISM
The optimal allocation for pooled resources is computed
by solving a centralized Linear Programming problem. Let,
exb(s) ∈ R+ be the energy traded from seller s ∈ S to
buyer b ∈ B; where B and S are the set of all buyers and all
sellers (both including the Grid {G}), respectively. Aligning
with the commodity as Energy (defined in Section II-B), at
any discrete time interval t, the buyers and sellers approach
to the real-time exchange market by providing a quantity q as
Eb(t) and Es(t), respectively. Therefore, for a buyer b the bid
structure looks like c ← (q = Eb(t), t) and the market offer
is o = (c, f = 0).1 Similarly, for a seller s, the bid structure
and the market offer are represented by c ← (q = Es(t), t)
and o = (c, f = 1), respectively. In addition to submitting
the net demand to the centralized exchanger, the mechanism
assumes that sellers submit the round-trip efficiency of their
locally controlled flexible devices. Therefore, the bids are
restructured as c ← (q =< Es(t), ηs >, t) where, ηs be the
round-trip efficiency of the battery (or other flexible resources)
of seller s ∈ S − G. The mechanism makes use of these
submitted round-trip efficiencies to compute the allocation.
The objective is to maximize the local energy exchange and
thereby minimizing the Grid exchange.
In order to do so, for a particular seller s, the exchanger
reformats ηs to ηbs, ∀b ∈ B and assigns ηbs = ∞ when s :=
{G} or b := {G}. The transformation can be written as, ∀s ∈ S
1The price component p is omitted since the mechanism assumes clearing
all bids and asks.
ηbs =
{
ηs, if b ∈ B − {G}
∞, otherwise. (1)
After receiving the quantities as bids from prosumers, the
exchange decides on the allocation that maximizes energy
exchange locally (equivalently, minimizes energy transaction
with the Grid2). The following objective function serves the
purpose of minimization of the Grid exchange with improved
allocative efficiencies
min
ex
∑
b∈B
∑
s∈S
ηbs · exb(s). (2)
The above objective function is subjected to the following
balancing equations for buyers and sellers, respectively.
Eb =
∑
s∈S
CM(b, s) · exb(s) ∀b ∈ B − {G}
Es =
∑
b∈B
CM(b, s) · exb(s) ∀s ∈ S − {G}, (3)
where CM is a “boolean” connectivity matrix representing
possible trading restrictions due to the electrical network
topology of the cooperatives. These constraints ensure that the
demand (and the supply) is met entirely through the exchange
with physically connected prosumers.
The optimization problem (Eq. 2) with constraints (Eq.3)
essentially forms to an assignment problem. In this paper, we
assume that the network is not restrictive, and it is therefore
modeled by a fully-connected topology i.e. CM(b, s) =
1,∀b ∈ B and ∀s ∈ S. Note that this mechanism is device-
agnostic, i.e., it is not considering the (locally-controlled)
storages’ internal specification in computing allocations.
The aforementioned optimization problem with associated
constraints is solved by the Linear Programming technique.
2The mechanism does not actually allocate any Grid exchange with
prosumers. Rather, it provides the optimal allocation among the prosumers.
Having said that, such a network topology is virtually pos-
sible by adapting advanced routing technology, e.g. Digital-
Grid [15] that provides every prosumer the platform to ex-
change power with every other prosumers in the cooperative
facilitated by the installed Digital Grid Routers in suitable
nodes.
IV. PROSUMERS’ UTILITY AND FAIRNESS OF THE
MECHANISM
In this section, we describe the utility of prosumers by
applying the coordination mechanism and go on showing how
the mechanism increases the utility of prosumers, improving
the social welfare [16] and thereby resolving the conflict of
interest of the prosumers. For ease of description, we number
the mechanisms as No flexibility (0), Individual control (1),
and Exchange and control (2), respectively.
Let N be the number of prosumers and T be the current
operation cycle. Further, let the demand and (PV) generation
of agent i at time t be di(t) and pvi(t), respectively. The net
demand at period t after applying mechanism m and deploying
the local battery of agent i ∈ N is defined as:
Dmi (t) = di(t)− pvi(t)− Exmi,−i(t) + pbi(t), (4)
where Exmi,−i(t) is the total energy agent i received from
other agents −i at time t utilizing mechanism m. Therefore,
Exi essentially is the agent specific decision allocated by the
exchange described in Section III. We suppose that surplus
generated energy is not permitted (or at least not remunerated)
to be fed into the grid, i.e. power flow from Grid G to agent
i, Dmi (t) is positive, with excess energy spilled:
DmG,i(t) = [D
m
i (t)]
+, (5)
where [x]+ = max{x, 0}. Since mechanism 0 and mechanism
1 do not impose any exchange, Ex0,1i,−i(t) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
The dispatched battery power of agent i at t is pbi(t), where
pbi(t) < 0 when the battery is discharged. When an agent
switches from No flexibility mechanism, the system encounters
losses due to the round-trip efficiency of activated batteries.
The overall loss contributed by i after switching to mechanism
m ∈ {1, 2} is given by
Lmi =
T∑
t
(
D0i (t)−Dmi (t)
)− θmi
=
T∑
t
(Exi,−i(t)− pbi(t))− θmi , (6)
where θmi is an offset power dispatched from/to the battery to
bring the final state of the charge to the initial one. Finally,
total loss of the system using mechanism m is calculated as
Lm =
N∑
i=1
Lmi = −
N∑
i=1
(
T∑
t
pbi(t) + θ
m
i
)
. (7)
In order to instill fairness in the mechanism, we adopt a
measure, namely difference evaluation function, which has
been widely employed in multiagent learning [17]. In this
context, the difference evaluation function of an agent i defines
the marginal contribution of i in reaching a joint system state
(i.e. loss in the system), L utilizing mechanism m. Formally,
Lmi = Lm − Lm−i. (8)
We define a component function that rewards/penalizes an
agent based on its marginal contribution to system loss (i.e.
Lmi ). It can be shown from Eq. 7, that the component function
links with the agent’s individual battery activation and there-
fore, provides a way to measure the effect of battery activation
and consequent profit sharing with other agents. Formally, for
agent i using mechanism m = 2,3 the component function
goes
Rmi = L
m
i − wmi Lm, (9)
where wmi constitutes the weights proportional to the contri-
bution of i using the following softmax function
wmi =
eL
m
i∑
j e
Lmi , (10)
where
∑
i w
m
i = 1, which makes
∑
iR
m
i = 0. It is an
important criterion to fairness argument as the total rewards
must be shared among all participated agents.
Finally, the utility of an agent i by applying mechanism m is
defined as the negative cost it incurs from the (total) payment
to the Grid, payment from/to the exchange (with other agents),
and the reward defined in Eq. 9. For a constant price p, the
utility function takes the following form
ui(m) = −p
[
T∑
t
DmG,i(t) + α
T∑
t
Exmi,−i(t)− (1− α)Rmi
]
,
(11)
where α = [0, 1) represents the price component (as a fraction
of p) an agent pays for exchanged energy. The complementary
price component, i.e. (1− α)) scales the Reward and thereby
controls the profit sharing between agents according to their
flexibility activation. Inherently, the utilities of No flexibility
and Individual control only contain the Grid payment com-
ponent. Note, that the price p is set out by the Grid and
is in our setting identical for all prosumers in the EC for a
particular operation cycle T . The acceptability of the proposed
mechanism depends on whether the proposed coordination
mechanism (m = 2) satisfies individual rationality of agents,
i.e.
ui(m = 2) ≥ ui(m = k), (12)
where k ∈ {0, 1}. The mechanism searches for the lowest α
that satisfies the following constraint∑
t
(
DkG,i(t)−DmG,i(t)
)
+Rmi < α
(∑
t
Exmi,−i(t) +R
m
i
)
,
(13)
3Mechanisms 0 and 1 do not engage in exchange and hence do not require
component function.
for m = 2, k ∈ {0, 1} and i = 1, . . . , N . Typical values of α
stay within 0.75 ≤ α < 1.0. In order to validate the efficiency
of the mechanisms in improving the social welfare, we define
the following utilitarian social welfare function
swm =
N∑
i
ui(m). (14)
Moreover, we quantify the relative fairness of a mechanism
based on the Nash social welfare criterion, an established
concept of fairness [16], applied to the improvement above
a baseline:
fm|k =
N∏
i
(ui(m)− ui(k)) , (15)
where m 6= k. Utilizing Eq. (4 - 12), it can be shown that
m = 2 improves both social welfare functions, i.e. Eq. 14 and
Eq. 15, and hence balances efficiency and fairness. The next
section supports this claim empirically.
V. A CASE STUDY OF LOCAL ENERGY EXCHANGE
In this section, we present experimental results of a case
study applying the proposed mechanism. The experiments are
conducted by taking samples of 10, 20 and 30 prosumers (so
called “scalability”) over 150 households from real residential
data [18]. We present experiment results considering the loss
reduction and the payments and social welfare after applying
various mechanisms. We use 10 and 20 prosumers cases for
Fig. 2. System loss reduction over Individual control with increasing diver-
sities in terms of number of prosumers (10, 20) and round-trip efficiencies.
loss reduction experiment, whereas 30 prosumers case is used
for payment and social welfare experiment. The prosumers
are assumed to be equipped with a battery4. In order to
experimentally investigate the effect of “diversity” on system
performance, the round-trip efficiencies of the flexible re-
sources are varied by sampling from normal distributions. The
PV generation patterns of a set of randomly chosen prosumers
are shifted uniformly with a span of [0,6] hours in order
4A residential Lithium-ion battery of capacity 6.8kWh with rated discharg-
ing and charging power of 3kW and 1.3kW, respectively. The SOC is allowed
to operate within 10% to 90% of the capacity. The degradation rate of the
battery is fixed as 0.1% of the capacity.
to form a local prosumer marketplace, simulating diversified
installation angles (e.g., east/west facing solar panels). The
simulation period covers 7 days, during which the exchange
is performed over each quarter-hourly interval.
Fig. 3. Example battery power dispatch (of one prosumer) by applying
Individual control and Exchange and control mechanism plotted over a day.
The exchange mechanism yields a “shifting” in battery scheduling.
A. Experiment: Loss Reduction
Here, we analyze the performance of the proposed mecha-
nism with respect to the loss reduction, as described in Eq. 7.
The experiments are performed over a number of trials, where
each trial contains an independently chosen subset of the
prosumers - the dataset of prosumers contains 150 prosumers.
The improvement in loss reduction using the Exchange and
control mechanism over the Individual control mechanism
(i.e. Lm=2 − Lm=1) for different number of prosumers with
increased diversity – measured by the variance in the dis-
tribution of round-trip efficiency of batteries – is depicted
in Figure 2. The positive loss reduction indicates that the
Exchange and control mechanism influences the flexibility
activation indirectly and thereby results in a system-wise
higher efficiency. As the scale of the EC grows, so does
the dominance of Exchange and control mechanism over the
Individual control. As for the experiment with “diversity”,
the Exchange and control mechanism takes the round-trip
efficiencies into consideration and reduces the loss further
with greater diversity. An agent-specific residual battery power
dispatch patterns, resulted from the Individual control and
the Exchange and control mechanisms for 7 days (plotted
in scatter on a 24-hour window) are shown in Figure 3.
The storage pattern, emerging from the Exchange and control
mechanism, shows a “shifting” tendency from that of the
Individual control mechanism, which is resulted from the
agent-specific realized allocation. The experiments confirm
that the proposed mechanism efficiently coordinates the local
flexible resources while resulting in a higher loss reduction
when compared to Individual control.
B. Experiment: Payment and social welfare
Lastly, we turn the analysis toward the payment strategy
of the exchange mechanism, and how the strategy makes
the mechanism preferable for all individual agents. Figure 4
0 2 4 6 8 10
ui(1) − ui(0)
0
2
4
6
8
10
u i(
2)
−
u i(
0)
Number of Prosumers: 30
Fig. 4. Prosumer utility improvements of Individual control (horizontal) and
Exchange and control (vertical) over No flexibility baseline, with marginal
cumulative distributions. Prosumers are above the dashed equal improvements
line, hence the new Exchange and control mechanism dominates Individual
control, while also vastly improving relative fairness f2|0 ≈ 8.89 · 1010 
f1|0 ≈ 3.24 · 103.
presents the relative increase in utility (i.e. decrease in cost)
for each prosumer of an EC with 30 prosumers, comparing the
improvements of Individual control and Exchange and control
over No flexibility. As seen in the figure, (ui(2) − ui(0))
dominates over (ui(1) − ui(0)) by placing itself over the
dashed line and by exhibiting a smoother cumulative distri-
bution. Therefore, it implies that the social welfare functions
defined in Eq. 14 and Eq. 15 are maximized by Exchange
and control mechanism. The Nash social welfare function
essentially balances the efficiency and the fairness. Therefore,
it is evident that the Exchange and control mechanism is
efficient and fair with the proposed payment structure.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, our first contribution is a market mechanism
– operating on a near real-time prosumer marketplace – that
ensures efficient allocation of flexible energy resources in
residential Energy Cooperatives (ECs). Our Exchange and
control mechanism is device-agnostic as it does not require
detailed modeling of the locally and independently controlled
distributed flexible devices (e.g. batteries). The mechanism’s
payment function rewards participating prosumers based on
their marginal contributions to the joint system states (i.e.
loss reduction), which encourages the prosumers to participate
in the exchange market while also resolving the conflict
of interest between prosumers. This results in an improved
utilitarian social welfare and improved fairness w.r.t. Nash
social welfare. Due to the bidding and exchange execution in
a near real-time fashion, the proposed mechanism inherently
reduces the necessity of predicting demand and generation that
are required for bidding in the day-ahead market. A detailed
case study over real demand/generation data for various scales
of EC with infused diversifications from underlying flexible
devices and a follow-up sensitivity analysis to achieve loss
reduction and improvement in social welfare has validated
the efficiency and applicability of the proposed exchange
mechanism in a residential EC setting.
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